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SMEs’ Credit Conditions during the Financial Crisis in Europe 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the role of firm-specific, macroeconomic, banking and financial environment 
factors in determining whether they were able to access external finance during the global financial 
crisis. Heckman’s selection approach is used to model the demand and supply of credit in the euro area 
during and after the financial crisis period. We conclude that since 2011, when the rejection probabilities 
for external credit applications peaked, the chances of obtaining credit have improved. However, young 
and small firms are still more likely to have their credit applications rejected. A decrease in government 
support such as guarantees increases the probability of rejection, as does a reduction in firms’ own 
capital and a worsening credit history. Among the bank-specific factors, an increase in banks’ equity 
capitalization reduces the rejection probability, while an increase in the cost of borrowed funds and a 
decrease in the competition levels raise the rejection probability. The legal structure to deal with 
insolvency disputes and the development of the credit information market have a significant bearing on 
credit availability, as we find that an increase in the time to resolve insolvencies and a reduction in 
adverse selection problems by credit information sharing increase the credit rejection probabilities. 
JEL classification: G20; G21; G23; G28; L11 
Keywords: Credit, Financial crisis; Supply and demand; Small and medium enterprises 
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1. Introduction 
In 2013, more than 99% of the businesses in Europe were small and medium enterprises (SMEs.) The 
significance of this economic sector is unquestionable for the economies in Europe, as it contributes 
75% of private sector jobs. Notwithstanding the governments’ demands, financial intermediaries have 
been reluctant to lend in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. Hence, despite unprecedented 
financial stimuli from the various governments and the ECB, there have been invariable worries about 
a credit crunch for small and medium-sized businesses. This is a serious issue, because the unavailability 
(or the rationing) of credit for these firms could manifest itself in the form of higher bank rates in 
comparison with larger firms, which typically have the option of restructuring backed by banks and 
other creditors. In one study by Anderson and Stallings (2013, p. 21).for the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) estimated the closure of more than one hundred thousand small businesses in 2012 in Italy 
alone. A recent focus on capital adequacy standards by the banking regulators likewise made it difficult 
for these businesses to source finance through traditional lending channels during the crisis period.  
Recently studies to estimate the impact of the financial crisis on the economy in general, and the 
corporate sector and financial industry in particular, have frequently been forthcoming (i.e. Kahle and 
Stulz, 2013, Tagkalakis, 2013, Chodorow-Reich, 2014, Cohen et al., 2014, Hall, 2014), but the damage 
caused by the financial crisis to smaller firms has been appraised by only a few studies (i.e. Carbo-
Valverde et al., 2013, Ogawa and Tanaka, 2013, Vermoesen, 2013, Casey and O’Toole, 2014, Holton 
et al., 2014). This study endeavors to fill this gap by identifying the crucial firm-specific characteristics, 
banking and financial market indicators and macroeconomic circumstances that drove the availability 
of credit to SMEs from banks and other creditors during the financial crisis. 
The choice of SMEs to observe the impact of credit crunch and crisis is based on the fact that in a 
situation when creditors in particularly banks are forced to repair their balance sheet and increase 
capital, smaller firms are most likely to be the victim of reduction in lending due to unavailability of 
proper financial records spreading over many years, less established relationship with banks and lack 
of viable collateral arrangements. European SMEs in particular are chosen due to the fact that the 
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countries that represents our sample represents a good mix of different stages of economic 
developments and business activities. The significant role of ECB means that banks in these countries 
were encouraged to increase their lending to SMEs at almost the same time and the impact of 
intervention by the regulator could be assessed better by looking into a number of countries over an 
extended time period. 
2. Determinants of Demand and Supply of SMEs Finance: Review of Literature 
A good number of studies have looked at the factors that contribute towards decision making process 
of banks and other financial institutions in approving of loan applications by SMEs as well as 
subsequent credit performance in terms of payments on time. Since the start of financial crisis in USA 
and other European countries, the number of such studies have been growing due to the role of these 
enterprises in employment generation and the fear of widespread unemployment if these firms are 
deprived of finance over an extended period of time. The push by the ECB to help ease the situation 
has also kept the issue alive. Some of these studies have relied on the cross sectional surveys as ours 
while some other have used loan performance data supplied by credit bureau and rating agencies to 
address the issue of how to separate demand and supply factors. In the following, we discuss the main 
outcome from some of the selected influential empirical studies published in the well reputed journals 
since 2006 in a chronological order.     
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) present the survey of recent research on access to finance and try to 
explain the not so clear evidence of significant contribution of SMEs activity in economic growth in 
particular cross country studies. The authors concluded that SMEs in a number of countries face hurdles 
in obtaining external finance affecting their growth and this could be one of the reason of unclear role 
by smaller size firms in promoting economic growth. Interestingly, authors suggested that “systems of 
credit information sharing and a more competitive banking structure could help facilitate the greater 
access to external finance by small opaque firms”. Shen et al. (2009) evaluated the SMEs finance 
activity in China. The authors find that that bank size measured by asset is less important factor in 
determining the acceptance of loan application by a small and medium size firm. In fact some of the 
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relevant bank specific factors in regard to approving credit for a SME include autonomy of local branch 
managers in decision making, incentive scheme, and enforcement of contracts. 
Similarly, Canales and Nanda (2012) study the impact of organizational structure of banks on small 
businesses lending. They concluded that bank managers with local market power and operating under 
decentralized organizational structure are likely to extend more loans compared to those operating in 
less competitive environment. The authors concluded that local banking environment is very important 
in determining the bankers’ willingness to extend credit to smaller businesses rather than just 
decentralized banking organizational structure only. Mac an Bhaird (2013) investigated the factors 
which influence demand and supply conditions in regard to SMEs external finance. The authors 
concluded that factors such as firm ownership, asset structure, age and size influence the demand for 
external credit while financially distressed firms suffer the most in obtaining external credit during the 
period of financial crisis and related credit crunch. One interesting result of the study is that once failed 
to secure loan, firms are less likely to be discouraged and would apply gain to secure external loans.  
Beck et al. (2013) explore the relationship between lending institutions financial structure and firms’ 
access to finance from different types of financial institutions. The study concluded that in a situation 
when banks have market dominance, SMEs use of external finance gets reduced irrespective of size. 
Specialized institutions are helping in extending credit to SMEs in developing countries. The study 
further concluded that contrary to general perception, there is no empirical evidence to support that 
smaller size banks extend more credit to SMEs. Modina and Pietrovito (2014) looked at the 
determinants of defaults for the Italian SMEs financing using a unique data provided by credit 
information bureau. The author’s findings suggest the importance of capital structure of the smaller and 
medium size firm. The other important factor in this regard is the terms of loan in particularly the cost 
of borrowed funds. The implication of this finding is that lending institutions would be reluctant to lend 
to those firms with less equity in the financial structure, unreliable sources of finance, profitability, 
current financial issues which all would lead to higher interest cost and subsequent defaults. 
Interestingly, authors suggest that economic variables are less relevant than firm specific factors such 
as capital structure in forcing defaults and missed payments. 
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Holton et al. (2014) investigated the demand and supply conditions in Euro area and find the strong 
impact of real economy on both demand and supply of external credit of the European SMEs. Weak 
economy not only reduce demand for credit by these firms but also increases rejections rates by the 
lenders as well as tightening of terms and conditions attached to loans extended to SMEs. Interestingly, 
worsening financial conditions have a significant impact on credit supply but not demand by SMEs. An 
increase in private debt levels in the economy also has a strong negative impact on chances of obtaining 
external credit by SMEs. Ryan et al. (2014) looked at the role of lending institutions market power on 
financing decisions in relation to requests from SMEs. The major finding of the study is that presence 
of a strong market power of banks exacerbates credit constraints of the SMEs. But interestingly, the 
impact of these constraints varies across different firm sizes and opacity levels. This negative impact of 
gaining of market power on the part of banks on SMEs credit availability varies depending on economic 
system in terms of ‘market’ or ‘bank’ dependent. The study concluded that banks exercise of market 
power is stronger in a bank dependent economy. 
A brief review of the selected studies above clearly indicates that financial structure, profitability, local 
market competitive conditions of the lending institutions are some of the important factors in 
determining the availability of external credit to SMEs. Economic conditions including indebtedness of 
the local population (businesses/individuals) also has a strong influence. Firm’s specific factors such as 
age, size, financial condition, autonomy, and a number of other factors are also important in determining 
the demand for external credit and subsequent outcome in terms of approval or rejection on the part of 
lending institutions. In the following, we discuss our chosen methodology to model demand and supply 
of external finance by utilizing the variables discussed above alongside a number of other factors 
deemed relevant in this regard.      
3. Methodology and Data 
We model firms’ external credit (C) supply and demand using a two-step Heckman probit selection 
equation method, in which the decision to apply for credit (demand) and the propensity of credit 
application acceptance (supply) are determined sequentially and jointly. The demand for credit is 
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determined by a dummy variable, which is equal to one when a firm applied for bank loans, trade credit 
or other external finance. The rejection of the supply of loan is more of an issue; hence, we construct 
this indicator by creating a dummy variable equal to one if a firm applied for credit and was refused, 
was offered credit but refused it due to the high cost or only received a limited part of it (less than 75%). 
The rejection propensity of the credit application of firm i is modeled by the following latent function: 
𝐶𝑖
∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑒1𝑖 (Credit rejection equation)  (1) 
where 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of independent variables that affects 
credit supply rejection. The unobserved characteristics of firms are captured by a random variable 𝑒1𝑖 
with distribution of 𝑒1𝑖  ~ N(0, 𝜎). The latent credit supply rejection propensity is represented by a binary 
outcome: [a] either the firm obtains credit (𝐶𝑖
∗>0) and consequently 𝐶𝑖
∗= 1or [b] the credit application is 
rejected (Ci*=0). Obviously, the above binary outcome is only observed if the firm has actually applied 
previously for credit. That is, if [c]: 
𝑍𝑖𝛾 + 𝑒2𝑖 > 0 (Credit demand/selection equation)                    (2) 
where 𝛾 is a vector of parameters to be estimated and 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of independent variables that affects 
the decision to apply for credit. In the above, similar to (1), 𝑒2𝑖 is another random variable with 𝑒2𝑖  ~ 
N(0, 1) that accommodates unobserved firms’ characteristics affecting application decisions. Following 
some of the recent studies in this area, such as Beck et al. (2008), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Artola 
and Genre (2011), Jimenez et al. (2012), Ferrando and Mulier (2013) and Holton et al. (2014), the 𝑋 and 
𝑍 vectors are identified with firm-specific variables such as firm size, organizational structure 
(autonomous), industry affiliation, turnover, age, owner’s gender, trend in profitability, fixed investment, 
inventories and working capital, internal funds, margins, capital position, leverage and credit history.  
More specifically, we start with firm specific variables which could impact on demand and/or supply of 
external credit. These include firm size, industry affiliation, financial autonomy, age, and gender of the 
owner. In an effort to observe the impact of firm size, we include two indicators and these include number 
of employees and value of gross sale. Three dummy variables are used for each indicators while fourth 
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is used as a reference category. The dummy variables to represent size approximated by employees 
include firm employs 10-49 (small), 50-249 (medium) and 250+ (large) employees. The firm employing 
less than ten employee (very small) is a reference category. Similarly, another variable to resent size of 
the firms also is represented by three dummy variables including sale turnover of 2-10 million Euros 
(small), 10-50 (medium) and 50+ (large). Firm’s turnover less than 10 million is a reference category in 
this regard. We include both indicators (number of employees and sale) due to special economic 
conditions prevailing during crisis or immediately after crisis period. Firm could have a significant 
number of employees but unable to utilize them due to depressed demand of its product. Authors such 
as Beck et al. (2006), Brown et al. (2011), Albareto and Russo (2012) and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) 
suggested a negative relation between size and of the firm. 
Firm’s affiliation with a specific industry could have a significant implications for the demand and 
supply of external credit. In particular after many years during and after crisis, construction industry 
activity remained subdued in Europe due to depressed demand for housing. We include three important 
industries in our empirical model which are represented by three dummy variables. These include 
construction, manufacturing and wholesale/retail. Other industries affiliation is used as a reference 
category. Firm’s accumulation of experience and learning is approximated by age. Three dummy 
variables are used to represent different age categories. These include relatively new (2-5 years age), 
experienced (5-10 years) and highly experienced (10+ years). Age category less than 2 years is used as 
a reference category. Following empirical literature, two other firm specific variables are include such 
as a dummy variable to resent financial autonomy of the firm and second a dummy variable for female 
headed firm. Financially autonomous firms are likely to take decision independently in terms of either 
to apply for external credit and when. Financial independence would also impact decisions in regard to 
utilizing of alternative source of finance as well as working capital, product design and pricing etc. 
Similarly, in some empirical studies, it has been reported that female headed enterprises are more likely 
to be constrained of external credit. Our study tests these prediction too subsequently. 
A number of variables to represent firm current performance in terms pf profitability, capital, and stock 
of debt are included which could have significant implications for both demand and supply of external 
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credit. The selection of these variables is based on the existing empirical literature in this rea nonetheless. 
We include two dummy variables to represent firm’s profitability in the last six months. Two of the 
dummy variables to represent firm profit performance include firm’s profit in the last six months has 
deteriorated or remain constant. Similarly, two dummy variable in relation to firms own capital position 
include firm’s capital in the last six months has deteriorated or remain constant. Lastly, firm’s debt 
situation is approximated by debt to income ratio. We include single dummy variable if debt/income 
ratio has increased in the last six months. 
Next set of firm specific variables include firm’s perception about future prospects, the provision of 
public (government) support in terms of guarantees, future economic prospects and banks’ willingness 
to lend. Starting with firm specific outlook with respect to sales and profitability, we include two dummy 
variables. These include outlook remained constant and deteriorated. Two dummy variables to represent 
firm perception about access to financial support including guarantees from government. Again we 
include public perception remained constant and decreased. Next we include two dummy variable in 
regard of firm perception of general outlook of the economy and banks willingness to lend to small size 
businesses. More specifically, these include general economic outlook worsened and banks willingness 
to lend worsened. Lastly, we include a dummy variable about enterprise perception in regard to its credit 
history. We code this variable equal to one if firm perceive that its credit history has not changed or 
deteriorated in the last six months.  
 In addition to above mentioned firm’s specific factors, we also included some variable which are more 
relevant for demand for external funds. Firms were asked to pick one of the option in regard to need for 
external credit due to a number of reasons. Some of these reasons to model demand for external debt 
include: firm need for external funds increased due to: fixed investment, inventories & working capital, 
internal funds or markup has decreased in the last six months. We use one dummy variable for each of 
these four reasons in our empirical model.  
Theoretical literature on monetary transmission and the credit channel has mainly focused on two 
channels. Holton et al. (2014) explained that “the credit channel comprises the bank lending channel and 
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the balance sheet channel which deal with the impact of banks’ and borrowers’ balance sheets, 
respectively, on the supply of credit.” A good overview in regard to the bank lending channel is provided 
by Peek and Rosengren (1995) who discuss the interactions between banking conditions and credit 
supply to firms. Mishkin (1995), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and  Beck et al. (2008).highlighted the 
importance of banking channels for the supply of credit due to ‘asymmetric information’ in the case of 
SMEs finance. Following this, we combine firm-related indicators (balance sheet and others) mentioned 
above with country and year specific average banking industry variables. These include bank 
capitalization measured by equity/total assets, loan quality approximated by two variables including net 
charge-off/net income and impaired loans/gross loans, liquidity shock measured by interbank ratio, 
profitability shown by return on equity, industry competition measured by total assets based Herfindahl 
index, loans growth, and interest paid and charged on loans measured by price of borrowed funds 
(deposits and interbank borrowing) and average interest rate charged on loans to customers and banks.  
Following Beck et al. (2006) and Holton et al. (2014), country specific macroeconomic conditions, 
financial market development and institutional quality that could have significant impact on loans 
application rejection or acceptance include government debt/GDP, GDP growth rate, private debt/GDP, 
GDP per capita and government bond yield. In addition to the above mentioned variable, our empirical 
model also include variables related to the financial market and legal structure that helps in screening 
bad customers as well as enforcing the loan contracts. Two of specific variables in this regard include 
time to resolve insolvencies (in years), and credit related information asymmetry proxy measured by the 
credit depth of information index. The credit information index measures rules, regulation and actual 
practices affecting the scope, coverage, and accessibility of credit information related to individuals or 
businesses available through either a credit registry or a credit bureau. The index values vary between 
‘0’ (very low coverage or credit information asymmetry) to 8 (high coverage and well documented credit 
information flow). Country fixed effects and calendar year effects are also included to accommodate 
country- and time-specific heterogeneity.  
The firm-specific variables are derived from the cross section surveys “Survey on the access to finance 
of SMEs in the euro area (SAFE)” collected biannually by the European Central Bank (ECB) between 
11 
 
first six months of 2009 and 20131. Banking and other non-firm data are extracted from Bankscope and 
the World Development Indicators (WDIs). 
Table 1 below displays the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in modelling the demand and 
supply of external credit of European SMEs. More importantly, for a group of variables representing 
financial/banking markets, legal structure and economic activity/cycle indicators, the difference 
between a lower value and higher indicates a large variation in the competition conditions, credit cycles, 
price of funds, time to resolve insolvencies, GDP growth rates and other macroeconomic conditions 
across European countries. This is expected due to the fact that our sample covers a 5-year period and 
18 countries with more than 8000 banks. We exploit this heterogeneity in our sample in estimating the 
conditional application rejection probabilities and building the scenarios. 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
4. Results 
Equations (1) and (2) are jointly estimated using a STATA Heckman probit model routine. We first 
jointly estimate the application and rejection propensities; subsequently these estimates are used to 
calculate the marginal effects and conditional probabilities of credit application rejections. Table 2 
shows the predicted conditional probability of rejection by country. By excluding those countries for 
which a reasonable number of observations is not available in the sample, we observe that SMEs 
operating in Cyprus, Belgium, France, Ireland and the Netherlands face a high risk of loan application 
rejection (followed by Finland and Italy). Interestingly, for almost all countries, a peak in rejection 
occurs in 2011 and the first half of 2012. The rejection probabilities since then have fallen significantly 
and were notably lower in first six months of 2013 (2013s1) compared with the overall average for 
almost all countries. The marginal effects estimates presented and discussed below also confirms these 
results where rejection probabilities peaked during 2011 and then started declining. 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
                                                          
1 For questionnaire and data detail, see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html 
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In an effort to observe the impact of each included variable in our credit rejection model (equation 1) 
and demand approximated by application (equation 2), we estimated marginal effect estimates of each 
variable and present in Table 3. Given the objective of study, we discuss marginal effects related to 
rejection equation only. Table 3 and Figure 1 show that an increase in enterprise size reduces the 
probability of rejection of credit application. This is true of all of the survey periods. Young and small 
enterprises are more likely to have their loan supply constrained. Excluding the exceptional case of very 
small firms, the differences in the rejection probabilities for other sizes is not noticeable. This finding 
is also reflected in the turnover marginal-effects coefficients, whereby firms with a turnover of 10 
million euros or more have roughly a 4% lower chance of credit application rejection. Beck et al. (2008), 
Artola and Genre (2011) and Holton et al. (2014) also find that larger and older firms face the lowest 
risk of having loan applications rejected.  
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
Firms in the construction business are also more likely to have their credit application rejected. Firms 
engaged in manufacturing activity, however, have a slight edge, with a marginally higher probability of 
acceptance of their application. Female-headed enterprises have a slightly lower probability of rejection. 
Interestingly, financial autonomy has no statistically significant bearing on the rejection chances. 
 
Next set of variables include firms’ performance related factors. Firm performance is measured in terms 
of profitability, capitalization and indebtedness.   Holton et al. (2014) conclude that firms that reported 
a fall in profits or had poor prospects in the upcoming months were likely to face reductions in credit 
availability. Our marginal-effects estimates confirm the fact that as profits decrease, the probability of 
rejection increases (although the increase in rejection probability is inconsequential and statistically 
insignificant, which is similar to Martínez-Sola et al.’s (2014) study of Spanish SMEs, in which they 
find no empirical relation between trade credit finance and profitability). According to Jimenez et al. 
(2012), a sign of borrowers’ creditworthiness is captured by their net worth. Since the crisis the net 
worth of most SMEs has been affected by a debt overhang, so even firms with profitable investment 
opportunities have been unable to fund those investments (Holton et al., 2014). Our estimates show that 
debt overhang leads to increased rejection rates by approximately 2%, while a reduction in the firm’s 
13 
 
own capital or worsening credit history increases the rejection probability by 6%, as creditors become 
wary of providing credit to SMEs that are highly leveraged and/or lack collateral.  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
Lodging of external loan application as well as subsequent acceptance could depend on firm perception 
about outlook with respect to its sales and profitability, public support in terms of guarantees, credit 
history, general economic outlook, banks willingness to lend and increasing dependence on external 
finance. Next set of regression coefficients show the application and rejection outcome with respect to 
these perception variables.  In terms of future outlook of profitability and sale, during times of economic 
uncertainty, stagnancy would indeed be a welcome scenario for firms and creditors, as the results in 
Table 3 show that a stagnant outlook reduces the probability of credit rejection. Similarly, reduced 
banks willingness to lend businesses as well as worsening credit history also increases the chances of 
loan application rejection. Lastly, an increase in demand for external finance due to investment, working 
capital requirements and reduction in internal funds also increases the chances of loan application 
rejection. These could in some cases could be inherent issues in the running of businesses or in some 
others, there could be a genuine increase in demand for external funds due to rising investment 
opportunities.     
 
Table 3 also displays the impact of bank-specific, market and economic conditions variables on the 
probability of SME credit rejection. Starting with economic conditions variables, the level of economic 
development is an indicator that could explain the differences in the credit approval mechanism across 
different European countries. Cole and Dietrich (2013), using the World Bank’s “Enterprise survey,” 
find that firms in countries with a higher per capita GDP are less likely to be denied credit. We would 
also expect a similar negative relation between rejection probability and economic development. Our 
marginal-effects estimates, also endorse this and show that, for each US$1000 increase in per capita 
GDP, the probability of credit rejection decreases by 0.8%. GDP growth rates, private debt and 
government borrowing however do not have a statistically significant impact on loan application 
rejection. One of the surprising result in this regard is the impact of government bond yield. One would 
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expect that rising yield in T-bill would indicate the trouble in government finances and resulting 
increase in uncertainties leading to more rejections. But our regression coefficient shows the otherwise. 
An increase in yield is linked with decrease in rejection probability. One of the possible reason could 
be that an increase in T-bills would result in crowding out of funds available for lending to private 
businesses leading to more rejections.     
 
Next set of variables are related to banking sector activity as credit from banks appears to be the main 
source of funds for SMEs all across the countries irrespective of the stages of development. It is evident 
from the marginal effects estimates presented in table 3 that higher capitalization of a bank results in a 
decrease in rejection probability. A 1% increase in equity to total assets reduces the rejection probability 
by 1.3%. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the four percentiles (P25, P50, P75 and P99) of banks’ 
capitalization ratios and the probability of loan application rejection. It is evident throughout the 5-year 
survey period that better-capitalized banks are likely to support a loan application. Hence, the 
capitalization of banks not only ensures longer-term survival of the banks but also encourages the 
intermediary to lend more to small and medium enterprises, in particular during times of financial and 
economic uncertainty. 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
Next we test the theoretical models of lending and industrial organization theory, which states that 
access to finance for firms depends on the market structure. One theory in this regard predicts a positive 
relation between concentration and credit availability (the information hypothesis) and a second 
supports the market power hypothesis, in which credit rationing is evident in less competitive banking 
markets. In our case there appears to be a strong relationship between the structure of the banking 
industry and the approval of loan applications. The marginal-effects estimates show that a decrease in 
banking market competition results in an increase in credit application rejection probability. Hence, 
consistent with the market power hypothesis supported by Ryan et al. (2014), our empirical evidence 
reinforces the notion that higher banking competition promotes lending to SMEs. Figure 3 shows the 
trend in the conditional rejection probability over different survey periods at four different levels of 
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competition. Countries with a competitive banking industry (with a lower Herfindhal index) have a 
lower rejection probability (around 10%) compared with a 40% probability of rejection in countries 
with very high concentration levels.  
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
Our empirical estimates also show that an increase in bank funding costs encourages banks to lend less 
and reject more applications. A 1 percentage point increase in the funding cost increases the rejection 
probability by more than 2%. Figure 4 shows the trend in the cost of borrowed funds and the application 
rejection probability. On average, in countries where banks are able to source funds at less than a 1% 
interest rate, the credit application rejection probability is 8–10% compared with a 20–25% rejection 
rate in those where the cost of borrowing is more than 4%.  
[Insert figure 4 about here] 
The relationship between the qualities of the loan (impaired loans as a percentage of total loans) is 
approximated by the marginal-effects figure of -0.004 in Table 3, indicating that a 1% increase would 
decrease the loan rejection probability by approximately 0.4%. Figure 5 shows this relationship more 
elaborately over the survey periods at four different cut-off points. It appears that more impaired loans 
would lead to a lower rejection probability. This relationship is observed consistently throughout the 
sample period. Again, this is a surprising finding given the fact that a higher proportion of bad loan in 
overall portfolio would compel financial institutions to decrease lending. But perhaps, institutions could 
prefer to lend to small businesses compared to individuals during the time of uncertainty with rising 
impaired loans.  Similar could be said of interbank ratio.   
[Insert figure 5 about here] 
One of the significant factors in our determinants of credit rejection modeling is the role of financial 
information asymmetries as measured by the credit depth of information index (CDI). The CDI scores 
range from 1 to 6, where 1 indicates a very low level of sophistication of information sharing and 6, an 
advanced one. Authors such as Love and Mylenko (2003) and Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) suggest 
the positive role of credit information sharing in the access to credit. Differing from the above studies, 
our results in Table 3 show that a 1 point increase in the CDI results in almost 9% increase in the 
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rejection probability. This relation is also demonstrated in Figure 6. It appears from the trend that 
improvements in the information flow would lead to banks rejecting more credit requests, probably due 
to a reduction in the adverse selection issue. This highlights the fact that, when banks and other creditors 
have to use soft information in the assessment of credit applications, it can produce more favorable 
outcomes for SMEs due to relationship banking. However, hard information compiled through credit 
information bureaus and rating companies could lead to a higher risk perception. This difference is 
captured in Figure 6, in which a country with a CDI equal to 2 has a 2–3% conditional rejection 
probability compared with a 25–35% probability if the CDI score is higher. 
[Insert figure 6 about here] 
 Kundid and Ercegovac (2011) argue that a lower cost of entry, a more efficient insolvency procedure 
and a low cost of contract enforcement encourage SME development. To test for the effect of the quality 
of the legal system, we use the average number of years from the filing for insolvency until the 
settlement of the dispute (this approximates the inefficiency of the legal system). We would expect a 
positive relationship between time to resolve insolvency and credit application rejection probability. 
Our marginal-effects estimates confirm this. A 1-year increase in unresolved bankruptcy results in a 
2.5% increase in rejection probability. Figure 7 also shows that on average SMEs operating in countries 
with advanced and developed systems to deal with bankruptcy have a better chance of obtaining credit 
from banking and non-banking sources, and this holds true irrespective of the survey time periods. The 
difference between less than 1 year and more than 3 years to resolve insolvencies seems to be substantial 
(in fact, on average a 2 times rejection probability with 4 years required to solve the insolvency dispute 
compared with 1 year). 
[Insert figure 7 about here] 
Lastly, in an effort to observe the severity of the conditions (firm-specific, economic and banking 
market, we develop and discuss the impact of three different scenarios on the probability of credit 
application rejection. Based on our marginal-effects estimates, Figure 8 shows three different scenarios: 
worst, middle and good cases. The conditional predicted probabilities of rejection confirm that the 
combined effect of macroeconomic, bank-specific and financial environment variables on the allocation 
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of credit is substantial. In particular, in the worst-case scenario, in which a firm is small and operates in 
an environment in which banks are less capitalized and have a high cost of funds, it takes longer to 
resolve insolvencies, and when credit bureaus are well developed, the probability of credit rejection is 
60% compared with less than 10% in the middle-case scenario. 
[Insert figure 8 about here] 
   
5. Conclusions 
We conclude that access to finance for SMEs in Europe has improved since the application rejection 
probabilities peaked in 2011 and the first half of 2012. Young and small enterprises with a bad credit 
history, high leverage and a construction sector affiliation are more likely to face hardship in accessing 
external credit. A competitive and better-capitalized banking industry improves the chance of a credit 
application being approved. Government support is crucial, as a reduction in this would lead to a higher 
rejection probability. A case for keeping the interest rate low by the European Central Bank is also 
made, as an increase in banks’ funding cost would lead to an increase in credit rejection probabilities. 
An inefficient legal system that results in a longer time to resolve insolvencies also increases the 
probability of credit application rejection. Similarly, a reduction in information asymmetries would 
reduce adverse selection issues and thus could increase the chances of rejection of an SME’s credit 
request. 
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Figure 1: Predicted conditional probability of credit rejection (by enterprise size)  
 
Source: Authors' calculation. Vertical bar above represent lower and upper confidence interval.  
 
Figure 2: Banking industry capitalization and 
conditional credit rejection probability  
 
Figure 3: Banking industry concentration and 
conditional credit rejection probability   
 
Source: Authors' calculation. Vertical bar above represent lower and upper 
confidence interval. 
 
Figure 4: Banking industry cost of funds and 
conditional credit rejection probability  
 
 
Source: Authors' calculation. Vertical bar above represent lower and upper 
confidence interval. 
 
Source: Authors' calculation. Vertical bar above represent lower and upper 
confidence interval. 
 
Figure 5: Banking industry impaired loans and 
conditional credit rejection probability  
 
Source: Authors' calculation. Vertical bar above represent lower and upper 
confidence interval. 
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Figure 6: Credit information depth and 
conditional credit rejection probability  
 
 
Source: Authors' calculation. Vertical bar above represent lower and upper 
confidence interval. 
Figure 7: Time to resolve insolvency and 
conditional credit rejection probability  
 
 
Source: Authors' calculation. Vertical bar above represent lower and upper 
confidence interval. 
Figure 8: Predicted conditional probability of credit rejection (scenarios)  
 
Source: Authors' calculation. Notes: Worse: small, (p25) equity to assets,(p90) HHI,(p90) time to resolve insolvency, credit depth of information index=6, (p90) 
cost of funds,(p25) impaired loans/gross loans Middle: large,(p50) equity to assets,(p50) HHI, (p50) time to resolve insolvency, credit depth of information 
index=4,(p50) cost of funds,(p50) impaired loans/gross loans Good: large,(p90) equity to assets,(p25) HHI,(p25) time to resolve insolvency, credit depth of 
information index = 2, (p25)cost of funds,(p90)impaired loans/gross loans. Notes: Horizontal bar above represent lower and upper confidence interval. The 
larger bar would indicate significant variations in the rejection probabilities. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Demand and Supply of SMEs External 
Finance (2009-2013)    
Variable Mean S. Dev. Min Max 
Supply of external finance (dependent variable=1 if yes) (d) 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 
Demand of external finance (dependent variable=1 if applied) (d) 0.443 0.497 0.00 1.000 
Enterprise number of employees -  10-49 (d) 0.333 0.471 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise number of employees -  50-249 (d) 0.254 0.435 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise number of employees -  250+ (d) 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise financial autonomy - autonomous (d) 0.868 0.339 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise industry affiliation - construction (d) 0.100 0.301 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise industry affiliation - manufacturing (d) 0.255 0.436 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise industry affiliation - wholesale/retail (d) 0.339 0.473 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise turnover - 2-10 million Euro (d) 0.259 0.438 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise turnover - 10-50 million Euro (d) 0.167 0.373 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise turnover - 50+ million Euro (d) 0.076 0.265 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise age - 10 years + (d) 0.132 0.338 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise age - 5-10 years (d) 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise age - 2-5 years (d) 0.021 0.143 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise headed by - female (d) 0.113 0.316 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise performance - profit- ↔ (d) 0.269 0.444 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise performance - profit ↓ (d) 0.474 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise performance - own capital ↔ (d) 0.544 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise performance - own capital ↓ (d) 0.204 0.403 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise performance - debt/assets Ratio ↑ (d) 0.207 0.405 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise perception about - outlook ↔ (d) 0.463 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise perception about - outlook ↓ (d) 0.294 0.455 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise perception about - public support ↔ (d) 0.277 0.448 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise perception about - public support ↓ (d) 0.218 0.413 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise perception about - credit history ↔ /↓ (d) 0.750 0.433 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise perception about - general economic outlook (d) 
worsened (d) 
0.828 0.377 0.000 1.000 
Enterprise perception about - banks willingness to lend (d)  
worsened (d) 
0.671 0.470 0.000 1.000 
Firm need for EF increased due to fixed investment (d) 0.165 0.372 0.000 1.000 
Firm need for EF increased due to invent. & working cap. (d)  
capital (d) 
0.204 0.403 0.000 1.000 
Firm needs for EF increased due to internal funds (d) 0.152 0.360 0.000 1.000 
Firm markup decreased (d) 0.487 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Economic conditions - government debt/GDP 85.907 33.819 0.000 219.500 
Economic conditions - GDP growth -0.618 3.008 -9.625 12.035 
Economic conditions - private debt/GDP 192.791 71.859 69.850 500.253 
Economic conditions - GDP per capita 37175.360 9816.925 13827.360 111813.000 
Economic conditions - government bond yield 4.609 3.411 1.360 25.070 
Banking industry - equity/total assets 8.208 1.501 4.390 19.310 
Banking industry - net charge-off/net income 3.486 31.241 -67.740 130.610 
Banking industry - impaired loans/gross loans 6.387 4.797 0.000 30.680 
Banking industry - interbank ratio 65.004 31.645 15.940 175.470 
Banking industry - Herfindahl index 0.108 0.062 0.050 0.482 
Banking industry - loans growth 0.470 4.975 -11.051 14.804 
Banking industry - return on equity 3.348 6.724 -50.820 27.680 
Banking industry - price of borrowed funds 2.308 0.780 0.764 5.568 
Banking industry - average interest rate charged 4.735 0.953 2.211 8.324 
Enforcement of contracts - time to resolve insolvency  1.505 0.574 0.000 4.000 
Information asymmetry - credit depth of information index 4.867 0.869 0.000 6.000 
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Table 2 Conditional Credit Applications Rejection Probabilities of Selected Countries SME’s   
2009s1 2009s2 2010s1 2010s2 2011s1 2011s2 2012s1 2012s2 2013s1 Average 
Germany 0.053 0.061 0.114 0.095 0.146 0.147 0.136 0.117 0.071 0.104 
France 0.168 0.184 0.284 0.250 0.335 0.336 0.318 0.285 0.201 0.262 
Belgium 0.187 0.205 0.312 0.277 0.366 0.368 0.349 0.316 0.225 0.289 
Finland 0.118 0.131 0.218 0.189 0.265 0.267 0.251 0.222 0.148 0.201 
Netherland 0.171 0.189 0.297 0.262 0.352 0.355 0.336 0.304 0.213 0.275 
Spain 0.083 0.093 0.160 0.137 0.199 0.200 0.186 0.161 0.104 0.147 
Italy 0.122 0.135 0.216 0.188 0.261 0.262 0.246 0.217 0.147 0.199 
Cyprus 0.338 0.361 0.484 0.444 0.541 0.541 0.521 0.483 0.380 0.455 
Greece 0.053 0.060 0.112 0.094 0.143 0.144 0.133 0.114 0.069 0.102 
Ireland 0.174 0.190 0.289 0.256 0.340 0.341 0.323 0.289 0.206 0.268 
Portugal 0.018 0.021 0.046 0.037 0.063 0.064 0.058 0.048 0.025 0.042 
Austria /Estonia 
/Slovakia/Slovenia 
0.056 0.064 0.119 0.100 0.151 0.153 0.141 0.122 0.074 0.109 
Notes: subscript s1 and s2 attached to years indicates first or second part of the year. 
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Table 3: Selected Average Marginal Effects of SME’s External Credit (dependent variables are 
applied and applied but rejected) 
Variables Rejected Applied 
Enterprise number of employees - 10-49 (d) -0.03250*** 0.06508*** 
Enterprise number of employees - 50-249 (d) -0.03410*** 0.08844*** 
Enterprise number of employees - 250+ (d) -0.03958** 0.1024*** 
Enterprise financial autonomy - autonomous (d) 0.01073 0.08648*** 
Enterprise industry affiliation - construction (d) 0.02325*** 0.003556 
Enterprise industry affiliation - manufacturing (d) -0.01141** -0.009751 
Enterprise industry affiliation - wholesale/retail (d) -0.009802 -0.02201** 
Enterprise turnover - 2-10 million Euro (d) -0.009219 0.04104*** 
Enterprise turnover - 10-50 million Euro (d) -0.04442*** 0.03972*** 
Enterprise turnover - 50+ million Euro (d) -0.04275** 0.04059*** 
Enterprise age - 10 years + (d) 0.02752*** 0.009839 
Enterprise age - 5-10 years (d) 0.04097*** 0.008510 
Enterprise age - 2-5 years (d) 0.05305*** 0.05057*** 
Enterprise headed by - female (d) -0.01389** -0.02457*** 
Enterprise performance - profit- ↔ (d) -0.005633 -0.008744 
Enterprise performance - profit ↓ (d) 0.008672 -0.01091* 
Enterprise performance - own capital ↔ (d) -0.004374 -0.007714* 
Enterprise performance - own capital ↓ (d) 0.06051*** -0.002906 
Enterprise performance - debt/assets ratio ↑ (d) 0.02365*** 0.1350*** 
Enterprise perception about - outlook ↔ (d) -0.04009*** -0.04893*** 
Enterprise perception about - outlook ↓ (d) -0.003735 -0.007629 
Enterprise perception about - public support ↔ (d) 0.003082 -0.01313 
Enterprise perception about - public support ↓ (d) 0.08993*** 0.02605*** 
Enterprise perception about - credit history ↔ /↓ (d) 0.01577*** -0.04212*** 
Enterprise perception about - general economic outlook worsened (d) -0.001224 -0.002858 
Enterprise perception about - banks willingness to lend worsened (d) 0.07042*** 0.1644*** 
Firm need for EF increased due to fixed investment (d) 0.06708*** 0.1566*** 
Firm need for EF increased due to inventories & working capital (d) 0.05856*** 0.1367*** 
Firm needs for EF increased due to internal funds (d) 0.02823*** 0.06590*** 
Firm markup decreased (d) 5.515e-04 0.001287 
Economic conditions - GDP growth -0.004604 -0.001746 
Economic conditions - private debt/GDP 1.262e-04 8.723e-05 
Economic conditions - government bond yield -0.002819*** -0.006580*** 
Economic conditions - government debt/GDP 5.331e-04  
Economic conditions - GDP per capita  -7.242e-06***  
Banking industry - equity/total assets -0.01303**  
Banking industry - net charge-off/net income 1.959e-05  
Banking industry - impaired loans/gross loans -0.003693***  
Banking industry - interbank ratio -3.227e-04**  
Banking industry - Herfindahl index 0.4753***  
Banking industry - loans growth -0.003861  
Banking industry - return on equity 4.773e-04  
Banking industry - price of borrowed funds 0.02257***  
Banking industry - average interest rate charged -0.003312 -0.007730 
Enforcement of contracts - time to resolve insolvency  0.02483*  
Information asymmetry - credit depth of information index 0.08517***  
Survey period -2009S2 0.01647 0.001900 
Survey period -2010S1 0.08851** 0.06360* 
Survey period -2010S2 0.06625 0.05917 
Survey period -2011S1 0.1219*** 0.06281* 
Survey period -2011S2 0.1216*** 0.08522*** 
Survey period -2012S1 0.1105*** 0.09571*** 
Survey period -2012S2 0.08962*** 0.1230*** 
Survey period -2013S1 0.02873 0.1074*** 
Observations 63,451 63,451 
Notes: symbols ↔ indicate no change, ↓ decrease and ↑ increase. subscript S1 and S2 attached to years indicates first or second part of the 
year. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. (d) stands for dummy variable. Countries dummies included in the empirical model but marginal 
effects not reported. 
